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JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR
ARBITRATORS' AWARDS
Despite the large amount which has been written in the field of labor
arbitration, one topic has received very little discussion-the problem of
judicial enforcement of those labor arbitrators' awards not in conformity
with the "law." This Comment will deal with that problem as it may arise
where suit is brought to enforce an arbitral award and one of the following
defenses is made: enforcement would cause the defendant to violate a
statutory prohibition; or the arbitrator disregarded or misapplied a court
decision I dealing with a labor contract provision similar to the one at issue.2
I. COMMERCIAL ARBITRTION
The problem of the role of courts in the enforcement of arbitral awards
has arisen in the context of commercial arbitration,3 and it seems appro-
priate to examine the solutions evolved by the courts in this area to see
what light they may shed on the question of the proper scope of judicial
review over labor arbitrators.
The first significant expression of the role of the courts vis-A-vis an
arbitrator was made over a century ago in Burchell v. Marsh.4 In reject-
ing the defendants' contention that the award should be set aside, Mr.
Justice Grier said:
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters
submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of set-
tling disputes, it should receive every encouragement from courts
of equity. If the award is within the submission, and contains the
honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of
the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either
in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the
judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the
parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the
end, of litigation.5
1 This court decision might be either that of a federal court or of a state court
applying federal law under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat 156
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
2 A separate problem, not discussed in the text of this Comment although treated
briefly in note 46 infra, is the situation where suit is brought to compel arbitration
and the defense is made that if the arbitrator were to decide for the plaintiff he would
be ordering a violation of law.
3 This Comment will maintain at least a verbal distinction by referring to all
arbitration other than labor as commercial arbitration.
4 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1855).
5 Id. at 349.
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The similarity between this language and that contained in section 10
of the United States Arbitration Act" is striking. Section 10 reads as
follows:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in re-
fusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the contro-
versy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so im-
perfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which
the agreement required the award to be made has not expired the
court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
Of greatest significance here is that the Arbitration Act does not deem
an arbitrator's "mistake of law"--i.e., a misapplication or misconstruction
of principles of law as announced by courts-a sufficient ground for over-
turning his decision. The courts have recognized and given effect to this
omission.
7
0 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1964). It should be noted at the outset, and will be discussed
more fully at note 21 infra, that a court does not review the award of a labor arbitrator
under the Arbitration Act but rather under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
In ELx.ouRI & ELxOUBi, How AIrrrATioN WoRxs (2d ed. 1960), there is a
discussion of the common law grounds for overturning an arbitral award. These
grounds may be profitably compared with § 10 of the Arbitration Act and the language
in Burchell. The Elkouris wrote:
The grounds for attacking awards . . .are generally limited to:
1. Fraud, misconduct or "partiality by the arbitrator, or gross unfairness
in the conduct of the proceedings.
2. Fraud or misconduct by the parties affecting the result.
3. Complete want of jurisdiction in the arbitrator. Also, failure of the
arbitrator to stay within his jurisdiction or to carry it out fully-that
is, he decides too much or too little.
4. Violation of public policy as by ordering the commission of an un-
lawful act.
Id. at 26-27.
7 See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 322 F.2d 173, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1963);
Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum Co., 312 F2d 299, 300
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Nearly 100 years after the Burchell decision, the Supreme Court
again spoke on the problem, in language reminiscent of that used by Mr.
Justice Grier. In Wilko v. Swan,8 the question arose whether a person
who acquired shares of stock which were subject to an agreement to
arbitrate must submit to arbitration rather than be entitled to a judicial
forum in the first instance. In that case, the Court felt that the policy of
the Securities Act of 1933 R-the protection of investors-was in conflict
with the policy of the Arbitration Act.' The Court held that the peti-
tioner was entitled to a judicial forum in the first instance, giving as its
reason the limited scope of judicial review over an arbitral award. Mr.
Justice Reed stated: "In unrestricted submissions . . . the interpretations
of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation." 11
This statement has given rise to some discussion in the lower federal
courts. A recent Ninth Circuit opinion, for example, stated that "manifest
disregard of the law" must be something more than an error in the law
or the failure of the arbitrator to understand and apply the law.'2 The
court suggested that Mr. Justice Reed used the term to refer to the situa-
tion where the arbitrator understands and correctly states the law but then
disregards it.'5
Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales
Corp.,'4 a Second Circuit decision, lends some support to this definition.
There Judge Clark declared:
The statutory provisions . . . in expressly stating certain
grounds for either vacating an award or modifying or correcting
it, do not authorize its setting aside on the grounds of erroneous
finding of fact or of misinterpretation of law . . .. [T]he
misapplication . . . of such rules of contract interpretation does
not rise to the stature of a "manifest disregard" of law.'5
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963) ; Stef Shipping Corp. v. Norris Grain
Co., 209 F. Supp. 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); General Constr. Co. v. Hering Realty
Co., 201 F. Supp. 487, 491 (E.D.S.C. 1962) ; Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
151 F. Supp. 853, 857 (W.D.S.C. 1957). But see Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration:
The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORN. L.Q. 519 (1960).
8 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
9 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
Io The policy of the Arbitration Act was stated by the Court to be:
the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complications of litiga-
tion. The reports of both Houses on that Act stress the need for avoiding
the delay and expense of litigation [H.R. REP'. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924)], and practice
under its terms raises hope for its usefulness both in controversies based on
statutes or on standards otherwise created.
346 U.S. at 431-32. (Footnotes omitted.)
"Id. at 436-37. (Footnotes omitted.)
12San Martine Compania de Navegaci6n, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd.,
293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961).
13 Ibid.
14274 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
15 Id. at 808.
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Since in Wilko the Court was faced with the hypothetical failure of an
arbitrator to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securities
Act, another interpretation of Mr. Justice Reed's language seems justified.
By "manifest disregard," he was referring merely to the situation where an
arbitrator ordered one of the parties to commit an illegal act, i.e., one in
contravention of the Securities Act.1
Under either interpretation it is the extraordinary commercial arbitra-
tion award that is overturned for a "mistake of law" 17-even though the
decision of the arbitrator is different from that which the court might have
made had it heard the cause in the first instance. Probably the main reason
why courts have been unwilling to overturn a "lawless" arbitration award
is that the parties have chosen the arbitrator to decide their disputes.' 8
They could have bound him contractually to apply principles of law cor-
rectly, but they did not. From this the inference can be drawn that the
parties desired an expeditious, impartial solution by an arbitrator rather
than a time consuming, "lawful" one by the courts. Thus the courts might
be said to be merely enforcing the original intent of the parties. This
reasoning is strengthened by acknowledgment of the function which com-
mercial arbitration performs in our society. As stated in Wilko, arbitra-
tion avoids the delays and expense of litigation 19 and, it might be pointed
out, lessens the workload of the courts. These advantages would be lost
if the scope of review of arbitral awards were broadened.
II. LABOR ARBITRATION
A. Introduction
In shifting from commercial arbitration to an examination of labor
arbitration, the question is whether there are forces operating in the labor
area which would justify the courts' reviewing arbitrators' decisions for
"mistakes of law" to a greater extent than they do in enforcing commercial
arbitration awards. Certainly labor arbitrators are as much creatures of
contract as commercial arbitrators, and the function they perform is per-
haps even more important. Mr. Justice Goldberg said:
Although labor arbitration has a resemblance to commercial
arbitration, in the sense that both arise out of contract, neverthe-
less, there is a significant difference which basically distinguishes
16 1f this is what was meant, it seems unobjectionable. See Evans v. Hudson
Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970, 974 (3d Cir. 1948) (dictum). However, to the extent that
the "manifest disregard" rule goes beyond an arbitrator's order of an illegal act, it
becomes of doubtful validity. Since arbitrators need not write opinions, the restraint
of the rule seems academic. Moreover the wisdom of a rule which might induce
arbitrators not to write opinions is questionable in light of the benefits generally
attributed to opinion writing. See generally MISHKIN & MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS
183-92 (1965).
31 See authorities collected at note 7 supra.
38 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1855).
19 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
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the two forms of arbitration. Labor arbitration fulfills one vital
function: the substitution of the judgment of a third party for the
use of economic force.2 0
In light of this statement it would seem that if there were to be any
difference in scope of review between commercial and labor arbitral awards,
the courts should review the labor awards even more narrowly than their
commercial counterparts.2 1 This reasoning would be conclusive if not for
Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour.
2
2
Lucas Flour was a suit for damages for breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement brought by the employer under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act,23 and the issue was whether the state court was
required to apply federal law. Writing for a majority of the Court, Mr.
Justice Stewart held that federal law pre-empted the field: "The dimensions
of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor
law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute." 2 The Court
reasoned that uniformity was necessary in this area because any other result
might prove deleterious to the collective bargaining process-uncertainty
as to whether a particular state rule or the federal rule would be applied in
construing a contract would have a disruptive effect at the bargaining table
and perhaps even keep an agreement from being reached.2 5  Drawing on
this reasoning, the contention has been made that there is the same need for
uniformity regarding the law to be applied by a labor arbitrator. 8 In the
arbitration situation, it is said, disruption is caused not by uncertainty as to
20 Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks At Arbitration, 20 ARm. J. 13, 14
(1965). See Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960): "In the commercial case, arbi-
tration is the substitute for industrial strife."
21 It should be noted that while the issue has never been expressly litigated, it
seems certain that a court takes jurisdiction of suits involving labor arbitration under
§301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), and would thus in no way be bound by the United States
Arbitration Act or the case law which has arisen thereunder. If this proposition were
not clear since the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), it is made clear by a comparison of the Second Circuit's
opinion in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, dismissed per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960),
with The Steelworkers' Trilogy, discussed at notes 27-31 infra. In Lawrence, where
a commercial arbitration agreement was at issue, the Second Circuit held that the
validity and interpretation of the agreement must be determined by the federal sub-
stantive law of arbitration as expressed in the Arbitration Act. The Trilogy, on
the other hand, involving disputes regarding labor arbitration, looked to the Labor
Management Relations Act, specifically to § 301, for guidance with regard to the
substantive law to be applied. However, this should not be taken to imply that a
federal court cannot look to the Arbitration Act or its case law for guidance. The
proposition put forward is merely that the court is not bound by such law.
22 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
23 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
24Id. at 103.
25Id. at 103-04.
2 See Hays, The Fucture of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1022-23 (1965);
Jay, Arbitration and the Federal Common Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 448, 452-53 (1962).
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conflicting forums but rather by uncertainty as to whether the arbitrator
will follow the federal rule, presumably known to the parties, or ground his
award elsewhere. The argument concludes that the latter uncertainty can
have the same disruptive effect on collective bargaining as uncertainty as
to whether state or federal law will apply. Whether this argument pro-
vides a sufficient basis for reversing the treatment generally accorded
arbitration awards, recognizing that much of the benefit gained by arbitra-
tion will be lost as the role of the courts is enlarged, remains to be seen.
Any answer to this question must begin with a consideration of The
Steelworkers' Trilogy.27 These cases dealt with the uses of arbitration as a
means of settling labor disputes. American Manufacturing and Warrior
& Gulf were suits to compel arbitration. At issue in American Manufac-
turing was whether an employee discharge was arbitrable under the extant
collective bargaining agreement. In Warrior & Gulf the question was
whether the employee had reserved the right to "contract out" as a man-
agement function or whether he had to submit the matter to arbitration.
The gist of the Court's holding in each case was that arbitration would be
compelled unless the collective bargaining agreement explicitly withheld
the matter from arbitration. In both cases arbitration was ordered. Enter-
prise Wheel was a suit to enforce an arbitral award. The Court, in order-
ing the employer to comply with the award, stated: "The federal policy
of settling disputes by arbitration would be undermined if the courts had
the final say on the merits of the awards." 2 8
While the three cases contain language which supports both the pro-
ponents of the uniformity argument and those who would argue against it,29
the overall effect is clearly to place a large amount of discretion with the
2 7 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960).
28363 U.S. at 596.
2 9 See, e.g.:
[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the
very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the
means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for
all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way
vhich will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties.
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
The process of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which
those who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
(Footnote omitted.)
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order
to reach a fair solution of a problem . . . . Nevertheless, an arbitrator is
confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agree-
ment; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
1966]
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arbitrator.3 0 Despite the Court's reasoning in Lucas Flour and the fact
that the Trilogy did not confront the precise issue here discussed,3 1 attitudes
expressed in the Trilogy must be given great weight.
B. Specific Problem Areas
1. Statutory Violations
It remains now to apply to specific problem areas the arguments for
and against the subjection of a labor arbitrator to judicial review and re-
versal for errors in construing or applying federal law. Perhaps the
simplest situation is where the arbitrator, purporting to interpret the con-
tract, orders one of the parties to perform an act which would violate a
congressional prohibition. As Professor Williston has said, "where the
subject matter of the contract between the parties lies in an area covered
by federal law, they necessarily adopt, as a portion of the agreement, the
applicable provisions of the particular Act of Congress." 3 2 Thus to the
extent that a collective bargaining agreement orders the commission of an
unlawful act, it is void. Therefore, the arbitral award, predicated on the
void contract, should be unenforceablePas
What case law there is in the area seems to support this result. In
Kreindler v. Clarise Sportswear Co., 4 the defendant resisted enforcement
of an award on the grounds that enforcement would cause it to violate sec-
tion 302(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act3 5 The court held
that subsection (c) (5) 36 exempted the conduct in question and thus the
defendant was not ordered to commit an unlawful act. The opinion clearly
implies, however, that if the act had been illegal, enforcement would have
been denied.
37
More recently a union brought suit for damages arising out of a labor
dispute, and the employer counterclaimed, alleging that the union had
violated the terms of an arbitration agreement between them by filing unfair
30 See REPORT OF SuB-COMMITTEE ON LABOR ABiTRATiON LAW OF SEcTION ON
LABOR RELATIONs LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocIAION, 35 Lab. Arb. 949 (1961) ;
Smith, Arbitrability-The Arbitrator, the Courts and the Parties, 17 ARB. J. 3, 8
(1962); Comment, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 707 (1961).
31 Of course, Lucas Flour did not confront this precise issue either.
324 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 615 (3d ed. 1961).
33 Put differently, this latter view can be expressed by a hypothetical in which A
and B enter into a contract whereby A will pay B to commit an unlawful act, and B
then changes his mind. In this situation A cannot go to the courts for enforcement.
34 184 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
3561 Stat. 157 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1964).
3661 Stat. 157 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1964).
37 The court devotes its entire opinion to a discussion of the legality of the con-
tract and the award made pursuant thereto. In this context, we can infer from the
following language that the court would not have enforced the award if the arbitrator
had ordered the employer to commit an unlawful act:
The fact that the employees of Clarise's contractors cannot share in the
payments based on their payrolls [which was alleged to be unlawful by the
employer but held lawful by the court] which Clarise has agreed to make
does not give Clarise the right to avoid its agreement as illegal.
184 F. Supp. at 184.
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labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board.38 The
court rejected this allegation, holding that "insofar as the arbitration
agreement . . . attempted to preclude by contract the Union or its mem-
bers from filing unfair labor practice charges against the company . . .
it is contrary to Federal law and is unenforceable." 39
A slightly different problem is presented when the defense is that the
arbitration award violates the public policy of the state in which compliance
would take place. For example, in Local 453, Int'l Union of Electrical
Workers v. Otis Elevator,40 an employee bad been convicted under New
York law 41 of knowing possession of gambling slips; the employer then
discharged the employee for violating the company rule against gambling
on the premises. The arbitrator ordered the employee reinstated, and the
union brought suit for enforcement under section 301. The Second Circuit,
reversing the district court, enforced the award: "[T] here is no substantive
principle of federal labor law which authorizes denial of enforcement on the
present facts for reasons of public policy." 
42
One of the employer's contentions in Otis Elevator was that the rein-
statement of the employee exposed the employer to criminal sanctions. The
court dismissed that allegation as spurious on the facts of the case; how-
ever, this raises an interesting problem--can an arbitral award which forces
a party to violate a state statutory prohibition be enforced in federal court?
This problem must be distinguished from the situation where the award,
while violating the public policy of the state, does not order the violation
of a statute. It is one thing to say that where state and federal policies
conflict the federal policy should be supreme, but quite another to say that
3 8 Local 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 220 F. Supp. 19
(D. Conn. 1963).
3
9Id. at 23. The "federal law" in question was § 10(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act; 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964), which
provides:
The Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce. This power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may
be established by agreement law, or otherwise ....
40 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
4 1 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 974.
42 314 F.2d at 29. This principle was explained more fully by Judge Timbers
in Jenkins Bros. v. Local 5623, United Steelworkers of America, 230 F. Supp. 871
(D. Conn. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 341 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
819 (1965). The court said:
[A]n arbitration board, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement may
arbitrate the question of just cause in the discharge of an employee for viola-
tion of state gambling laws notwithstanding the existence of a public policy
of the state against gambling . . . . [S]uch state policy is not controlling
over, but must yield to the substantive principles of national labor law which
the federal courts are empowered to fashion-in short, the public policy of
the United States as declared by the federal courts in the field of national labor
law must prevail over any state public policy asserted to the contrary . ...
Id. at 872. This proposition seems clearly correct on its facts; where an arbitral
award violates a state's public policy but does not order the employer to violate the
state's law, clearly the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration, United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960),
should control.
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a federal court should order a party, under pain of civil contempt proceed-
ings, either to commit a crime or to do an act which would make him liable
for damages in a civil suit. Clearly a federal court should not have the
power to put a party to this choice. Consequently, while an arbitration
award which violates the public policy of the state but does not order a
statutory violation should be enforced, an award which requires that a
statute be violated should not be enforced."
The most difficult problem in the area of statutory violations is the
situation where the defendant in the suit for enforcement claims that the
award orders him to commit an unfair labor practice. For example, what
should a court do when a union sues for enforcement and the employer
alleges that the award orders him to discharge an employee who has lost
his membership in the union for reasons other than the nonpayment of
dues? 45 What makes this situation more difficult than the other "unlawful
acts" cases is that here the court would have to make determinations of
unfair labor practices in the first instance, a practice which conflicts with
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction-that such determinations should be
made initially by the National Labor Relations Board.46
4 3 In a recent Supreme Court opinion, Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966), the Court held that Congress, in
passing a statute requiring arbitration between railroads and unions respecting the
size of train crews, would not be deemed to have superseded a state statute regulating
the size of these crews. The Court said that while Congress has the authority under
the commerce clause to supersede such state legislation, Congress must do so explicitly.
Similarly, in the hypothetical case posed in the text, there has been no express dele-
gation from Congress to an arbitrator which would allow him to make an award in
violation of state law; thus, if he makes such an award, a federal court should deny
enforcement. It might be added that were Congress to make such an express dele-
gation to an arbitrator, giving him the authority to supersede state law, there would
be serious question as to its constitutionality. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (delegation to private groups unconstitutional).
One of the problems with the position that a federal court cannot enforce an
arbitral award which orders a violation of either state or federal law is the role of
the arbitrator. Must he decide, for example, whether the granting of an award to A
would force B to commit a crime, or should he leave this job to the courts? It would
seem that he should refuse to grant the award only in those situations where it is
clear that enforcement would cause violation of law. His area of expertise does not lie
in interpreting penal statutes, and thus in all but the clear cases B must get his relief
from the courts.
44 This reasoning suggests the conclusion that where the arbitrator orders the
violation of state common law, e.g., state law of defamation, his award should not be
enforced. It does not seem, however, that this situation will often occur.
45 See Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy, 9
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 360, 373 (1962). The textual reference is to § 8(a) (3) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964),
which provides in pertinent part:
[N]o employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for
non-membership in a labor organization . . . (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons
other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership . ...
4 6 Trailways of New England, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees
of America, 343 F.2d 815, 818 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); see
United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
The Trailways case, which stated that the question whether a given set of facts
constitutes an unfair labor practice is in the first instance for the Board, should be
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A number of courts have been faced with this problem; the results
have been mixed. In Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 7 the
Fourth Circuit considered the legality of an award ordering the employer
to negotiate on proposed wage increases. The award was handed down on
September 24, 1958; six days later the collective bargaining agreement
expired, and one day after that the vnion was decertified as the result of an
election held by the Board. Judge Haynsworth, writing for a unanimous
court, stated:
it seems . . . that we have the simple case of a minority union
seeking to act as the exclusive representative of the employees
with respect to their wages for this limited period. If we compel
the employer to bargain with the union under these circumstances,
we compel the employer and permit the union to commit an unfair
labor practice in violation of the rights guaranteed to the em-
ployees under § 7.48
Similar reasoning was employed by the First Circuit in Local 1898,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Brake & Electric Sales Corp.49 The court
there held, in construing a contract in the absence of an arbitration clause,
that since the employer had a reasonable belief that membership in the
union was not accorded to employee Resnick on the same terms and con-
ditions by which other employees could become members, discharge of
Resnick by the employer would have been an unfair labor practice. ° Thus
the court held that there had been no breach of the union security clause
distinguished from the situation where one party brings suit to compel arbitration
and the other defends on the ground that if the arbitrator were to hold for the first
party he would be ordering the commission of an unfair labor practice. In this situ-
ation, the courts have ordered arbitration. See, e.g., Carey v. General Elec. Co., 315
F2d 499, 508-11 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964); International
Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 82 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), offd per curiam, 326 F.2d 758 (2d Ci-. 1964); Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Corp., 53 L.R.R.M. 2204 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (held for defendant on other
grounds). These cases seem correct; a court should not presume that an arbitrator
will render an "unlawful" decision. Moreover, there may be a "therapeutic" value in
submitting a case to an arbitrator even though he can only decide it one way. See
text accompanying note 79 infra.
47283 F2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
48 Id. at 940. Query whether the case is so clear as Judge Haynsworth would
have us believe. Until decertification the employer would have the duty to bargain
regardless of actual minority if indeed the matter were appropriate for bargaining.
It might be thought that deeming the conduct here an unfair labor practice would
condone an employer delay. The case is presented here merely as an example of a
court willing to forego notions of primary jurisdiction. The court referred the case
back to the arbitrator who, it said, could order the employer to negotiate directly with
the employees. Ibid.
49 279 F.2d 590 (lst Cir. 1960).
60Id. at 592. The court felt that the conduct would violate § 8(a) (3) of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1964), which provides in pertinent part:
[N]o employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-
membership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the
same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members . ...
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of the contract. The fact that the case originated with the district court
rather than with an arbitrator does not undercut its value as showing the
court's willingness to overlook notions of primary jurisdiction, at least in
certain situations.51
The decisions on this point, however, are far from unanimous. In
Locals 234 & 243, ILGWU v. Beauty Bilt Lingerie, Inc.,52 the court, with-
out discussion, dismissed on a number of grounds the allegation that en-
forcement of the arbitrator's award would require violation of section 8(e)
-the "hot cargo" provision5 One ground for dismissal was the primary
jurisdiction of the Board. Thus the court enforced the award without
looking into the unfair labor practice charges.
The Supreme Court showed a similar bent in Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n
v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.M5 In that case a non-majority union entered into
a "strike settlement" with the employer; the Court enforced the agree-
ment, limiting its discussion to whether such an agreement was cognizable
under section 301. The Court did not even mention the possibility that
such conduct might constitute an unfair labor practice - and made only the
following statement with regard to the status of the union: "[I]f the federal
courts' jurisdiction under § 301 (a) required a preliminary determination
of the representative status of the labor organizations involved, potential
conflict with the National Labor Relations Board would be in-
creased .... " 56
Analysis of these cases reveals two courses of conduct which a court
might take when faced with the defense that enforcement of an arbitration
award will compel one of the parties to commit an unfair labor practice.
Glendale held, and Brake & Electric implied, that where such a defense
was raised the court would forego notions of primary jurisdiction and
decide the unfair labor practice question for purposes of the enforcement
proceeding. On the other hand, in Lion Dry Goods and Beauty Bilt these
defenses were ignored; the only question discussed was whether the
arbitrator decided the problem submitted to him. A third possibility might
be for the court to stay the proceedings before it until the Board has had
a chance to rule on whether the conduct was indeed an unfair labor practice.
The prerequisites for implementing this alternative would be met, for
example, if the employer (assuming he is the defendant in the court pro-
151 It should be noted, however, that the same court which decided Brake &
Electric stated in Trailways of New England, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Employees of America, 343 F.2d 815 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965),
that questions of the existence of an unfair labor practice are, in the first instance,
for the Board. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
0248 L.RPRM. 2995 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
3 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 543, 29
U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
54369 U.S. 17 (1962).
5 Only a year earlier, in ILGWIU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961), the Court
had upheld a Board determination that similar conduct constituted an unfair labor
practice.
56 369 U.S. at 29.
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ceeding) petitions the Board, alleging that the union is violating section
8(b) (2) 7 or one of the other applicable provisions regarding union unfair
labor practices. As a final possibility, the court might set aside the award
only in those situations where the ordering of an unfair labor practice is
clear: for example, where a court is asked to enforce a "hot cargo" clause 58
identical to others previously declared unlawful by the Board.
By process of elimination the first alternative-that the court forego
notions of primary jurisdiction and decide the unfair labor practice question
for purposes of the enforcement proceeding-seems the best.59 The second
would carry with it the possibility that after the court tells a party that he
must comply with the terms of an award the party will be faced with further
litigation and a Board order to cease and desist from such conduct. It is
true that the Board, in International Harvester Co., 0° held that it would
defer to the arbitrator's determination that the conduct involved would not
constitute an unfair labor practice in situations where "the arbitration pro-
ceedings were [not] tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness or serious pro-
cedural irregularities . . . . " 1 But the arbitrator's determination is not
the final word in all cases. In many situations the arbitrator would not
want to become embroiled in the decision whether certain conduct consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice; his area of expertise lies in interpreting
contracts, not statutes. In those situations where the arbitrator makes no
findings as to an alleged unfair labor practice, International Harvester
would be inapplicable and the defendant in the court proceeding would be
subject to further litigation before the Board. Even if this defendant peti-
tioned the Board at the time of the issuance of the award and obtained
from the court a stay of the enforcement proceeding, as suggested in the
third possibility above, the parties would be subject to the expense of dual
litigation and delay before the litigation is settled. This expense and delay
would, to a great extent, undermine one of the major functions of labor
arbitration.
Although some of this expense, delay and dual litigation may be elim-
inated in some cases, if the court is permitted to decide the unfair labor
practice defense only where the answer is clear, the presence of these prob-
lems in cases where existence of an unfair labor practice is uncertain must
57 Section 8(b) (2), 61 Stat 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2)
(1964), is singled out because in a great many cases the employer's complaint will
be that the union is attempting to cause him to violate § 8(a) (3). Section 8(b) (2)
provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
... (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
any employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section ....
58 73 Stat 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
59 Implicit in this conclusion is the assumption that the judiciary, even in unclear
cases, will decide the issue correctly more often than not. This assumption seems
justified by the fact that the courts of appeals which review the Board unfair labor
practice findings would here review the enforcement proceedings.
60 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), aff'd sub norn. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
9'Id. at 927.
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be weighed against the dangers of allowing the courts to decide all such
cases. The court would be deciding the case only for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the arbitrator's award should be enforced and thus would
not be robbing the Board of its jurisdiction to police such practices. 62
Moreover, while it is true that another of the purposes of the primary
jurisdiction rule-to have a-single agency develop a uniform set of rules-
would be somewhat impaired, the extent of impairment would not seem to
be very great. The Board would not be bound by the rules enunciated by
the court, either in the same case if the court held that the conduct did
not constitute an unfair labor practice and the Board disagreed, or in later
cases involving similar facts 3 Further, a court would most likely do its
best to apply rules already formulated by the Board; this would be another
factor mitigating the absence of a single set of rules.1e
There is one situation, of course, where the Board would not have
the opportunity to rectify an error committed by a court-where the court
concludes that the employer's conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice
and refuses to enforce the award, and the Board would have found other-
wise. While this is certainly a possibility and could be looked upon as
having detrimental effects on the arbitration process, the alternative of
deferring in all but the very clear cases 6 would seem more detrimental
in terms of delay and expense. On balance then the wiser course would be
for the courts to forego notions of primary jurisdiction in all section 301
actions involving arbitral awards66
The above discussion demonstrates that in all situations where the
labor arbitrator's award orders one of the parties to commit an unlawful
act, the award should not be enforced. This conclusion, however, is no
victory for the proponents of the uniformity argument.6 7  Rather it is
reached because the courts would deem the contract itself as unlawful and
therefore unenforceable."8 The real test of the uniformity argument comes
6249 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964) provides:
The Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise ....
63 Ibid.
64The Board could apply its reasoning in International Harvester Co., see text
accompanying notes 60-61 supra, to the situation where the court decided the unfair
labor practice in the first instance. The decision of when to defer to the court's
determination would be solely at the discretion of the Board.
5And who is to say which cases are dear? Judge Haynsworth deemed Glendale
a clear case-query whether it is. See note 48 supra.
66 See Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HAv.
L. Rxv. 529 (1963) ; cf. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
Professor Sovern supports the result in Lion Dry Goods but thinks that this is
the only type of case, i.e., a "no-majority" case, where the court should ignore an
unfair labor practice defense. Sovern, supra at 562-65.
67 See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
68 See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
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in the area next to be examined-where the defense in the enforcement
proceeding is that the award does not comport with court decisions con-
struing similar contract provisions.
2. Noncompliance with Court-made Law
In Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,69 the Second Circuit, in construing a con-
tract in the absence of an arbitration clause, decided that the seniority
rights of certain employees had "vested" and could be enforced even after
the contract between the employer and the union had terminated. Should
a court in the Second Circuit, or in any circuit, refuse to enforce an
arbitrator's award which does not comply with Zdanok in a case where the
contract and facts with which he deals are indistinguishable from Zdanok?
Should it make any difference how well "established" the rule in question is?
It would seem that before the uniformity argument could be deemed
at all persuasive, the federal rule in question would have to be well estab-
lished.70 For if there is a dispute among the various federal courts as to
the proper interpretation of a certain type of labor contract, it could hardly
be argued that the arbitrator contributed to the uncertainty of the parties'
expectations by failing to follow one of the "rules." 71 Even assuming that
the "rule" at issue is "established," however, it is far from clear that the
uniformity consideration should control. This problem has not yet been
considered by the courts. One commentator has suggested that once the
substantive law has been incontrovertibly "established" in the federal
courts, the arbitrator should consider himself bound or at least authori-
tatively guided by that law. These views seem not to be limited to labor
arbitration and would provide guidelines for commercial arbitration as
well.72 At any rate, this does not solve our problem; even if arbitrators
should consider themselves guided, or bound, by federal law, what should
69 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
70 This condition is not at all clear with regard to Zdanok. See, e.g., Proctor &
Gamble Independent Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963) ; Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d
143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962).
71 This reasoning might lead to the conclusion that only when the Supreme Court
has spoken can there be an "ascertained" federal rule. Until such time as the Court
has spoken, there is likely to be a dispute among the circuit courts and the state courts
applying federal law under § 301.
72 Katz, Discussion of-Feinberg, Do Contract Rights Vest?, in LABoR ARaTA-
TION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 223, 229-30 (Kahn ed. 1963). Mr. Katz stated:
Arbitrators, like judges, are clothed with great discretion but their judgment
must be exercised within a framework of law. Each arbitrator is not a
separate solar system unattached to the national labor policy and its consti-
tutional interpreters; he operates also within the framework of that policy
as delineated by law and interpreted and applied by the courts of the United
States. Any other concept of arbitral power represents basically an unac-
ceptable usurpation of judicial authority and would be essentially a major
step toward industrial anarchy. It would be difficult to conceive a policy
more likely to destroy the institution of voluntary arbitration.
Ibid. See note 82 infra.
1966]
1064 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.114:1050
a court do if an arbitrator advertently or inadvertently does not so bind
himself ?
Dean Smith has suggested a possible answer to this question. In
introducing the problem, he has said:
[W]e are here involved in an area of special difficulty in view of
the ultimate control which the federal judiciary has over the arbi-
tration process, the role ascribed to it in developing a federal law
concerning the labor agreement, and the disposition of the Su-
preme Court, evident in areas such as the delineation of federal
and state authority, to regard as desirable a pattern of national
uniformity of labor law.73
For Dean Smith, who restricted his analysis to situations where the Su-
preme Court has spoken, the answer would seem to turn on whether we
view the Court's decision as only an interpretation of the contract before
it or whether the decision carries implications for federal labor law.7 4 If
the former view were adopted, the arbitrator's award would be enforced
whether or not he followed the Court's decision; if the latter were adopted,
it would not.
Getting back to the specific problem raised by the Zdanok case, and
even assuming that the rule in question is well established, the uniformity
argument should not prevail. Initially it should be kept in mind that if the
parties had felt any great need for certainty, i.e., if any uncertainty as to
whether the arbitrator would apply federal law was disrupting the collective
bargaining process, they could easily have removed the problem by provid-
ing in the contract that in any dispute over the meaning of the terms, the
arbitrator was correctly to apply federal substantive law. If the parties
had done this and the arbitrator had then handed down an award which
did not comport with federal law, the court could deny enforcement on the
simple ground that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of submission.
To the extent that the parties have not so bound the arbitrator, they have
shown a preference for his unrestricted judgment even at the cost of un-
certainty. More importantly, the parties have shown a desire to settle their
disputes in the most expeditious manner possible, without the delay and
expense of litigation. Granting to the courts a broad scope of review in this
type of case would eliminate the value of the arbitration process and could
cause the process to fall into disuse. This would be a very heavy price
to pay considering Mr. Justice Goldberg's words that "labor arbitration
fulfills one vital function: the substitution of the judgment of a third party
for the use of economic force." 75
Thus whether or not we accept Dean Smith's dichotomy and brand
Zdanok a case where the court has merely interpreted the contract before
73 Smith, Arbitrators and Arbitrability, in LABOR ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL
CHANGE 75, 93 (Kahn ed. 1963).
74Ibid.
75 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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it, it seems that in a case where all that is involved is whether the arbitrator
failed to follow federal court standards in interpreting the terms of the
contract before him, the reviewing court should nevertheless enforce the
contract.
Another context in which this problem appears is the question whether
an arbitrator, given the authority by the parties to decide the question of
arbitrability, is governed, as the courts applying federal law have been
since the Trilogy, by the presumption favoring arbitrability. The Court in
Warrior & Gulf said that arbitration would be compelled under a general
arbitration clause unless the subject matter was explicitly withheld from
the arbitrator by another clause of the contract, or unless there was "force-
ful evidence of the purpose to exclude." 76 The question arises whether a
court should overturn an arbitrator who has not bound himself by this
presumption in a situation where the contract states that the arbitrator is
to determine the question of arbitrability.
In a recent district court case, Metal Products Union v. The Torring-
ton Co.,77 the court upheld the arbitrator's determination of no arbitrability
on the ground that the arbitrator had found, through "extrinsic evidence,"
that the parties had reached an agreement that the dispute would not be
arbitrable. However, the court indicated in dictum that an arbitrator, when
determining substantive arbitrability, will be held to the same standard as
a court under Warrior & Gulf.78 This dictum seems questionable, for in
addition to the reasons discussed above as to why an arbitrator should not
be overturned for failing to comply with federal court-made law, it is
necessary to consider the reason for the rule in Warrior & Gulf. Mr.
Justice Douglas' Trilogy opinions are replete with language indicating the
"therapeutic" service that an arbitrator can perform-soothing the feelings
of both sides and thus preventing industrial strife.79 This is a fine rule
when the issue is whether a question should be submitted to an arbitrator
in the first instance. However, when the case is already before the arbi-
trator on the question of arbitrability, he can perform his "therapeutic"
service at that time; it is not necessary for him to reach the merits of the
dispute to do so.80 Thus Dean Smith has concluded on this question that
the courts "settle issues of arbitrability only at the level of the propriety
of judicial interception or review of the arbitration process. They lay down
rules for the courts, not for the arbitrators .. 81
76 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
584-85 (1960).
77242 F. Supp. 813 (D. Conn. 1965).
78 Id. at 821 n.26.
79 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 578 (1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
8o As a practical matter, one might try to imagine in how many cases an arbi-
trator will hold a matter not arbitrable where the question is at all doubtful.
81 Smith, op. cit. supra note 73, at 92. The argument that in the Trilogy the
Supreme Court was clearly shaping federal labor policy and that this policy must
govern arbitrators, not for reasons of uniformity but for the same reasons we feel
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Thus it seems that labor arbitrators should be bound by federal law,
subject to the penalty of having their awards overturned only in cases where
the award would order one of the parties to commit an unlawful act. In all
other cases the gain in uniformity would be heavily outweighed by the addi-
tional delay and expense which would be a concomitant of wider judicial
review.82 Moreover, a wider scope of review would cut deeply into the
congressional policy--expressed in section 203(d) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act-favoring "final adjustment" by the parties.83
that an arbitrator cannot order a party to violate a statute, must also fail. Putting
aside Dean Smith's observation that the presumption was not meant to apply to arbi-
trators, there is the additional problem that in this situation the contract cannot be
deemed unlawful. The rule of the Trilogy, although it shapes federal policy, is still a
rule of construction; it is not a standard which a contract must meet or be held
unlawful. Therefore, in all such decisions shaping federal policy, see, e.g., John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), only "uniformity" can be
argued and, as has been suggested, uniformity cannot be argued persuasively.
82 This is not to suggest, of course, that an arbitrator should not look to a federal
court, or any other authority he deems appropriate for guidance in reaching his decision.
However, since it is his decision for which the parties have contracted, the arbitrator
should not hesitate to disregard any court decision which he thinks incorrect or inap-
propriate as applied to the case before him.
861 Stat 154, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964). This section provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
